

# Fashionable Nonsense

Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science

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*For Marina*

*For Claire, Thomas and Antoine*



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## Preface to the English edition

The publication in France of our book *Impostures Intellectuelles*<sup>1</sup> appears to have created a small storm in certain intellectual circles. According to Jon Henley in *The Guardian*, we have shown that “modern French philosophy is a load of old tosh.”<sup>2</sup> According to Robert Maggiori in *Libération*, we are humorless scientific pedants who correct grammatical errors in love letters.<sup>3</sup> We would like to explain briefly why neither is the case, and to answer both our critics and our over-enthusiastic supporters. In particular, we want to dispel a number of misunderstandings.

The book grew out of the now-famous hoax in which one of us published, in the American cultural-studies journal *Social Text*, a parody article crammed with nonsensical, but unfortunately authentic, quotations about physics and mathematics by prominent French and American intellectuals.<sup>4</sup> However, only a small fraction of the “dossier” discovered during Sokal’s library research could be included in the parody. After showing this larger dossier to scientist and non-scientist friends, we became (slowly) convinced that it might be worth making it available to a wider audience. We wanted to explain, in non-technical terms, why the quotes are absurd or, in many cases, simply meaningless; and we wanted also to discuss the cultural circumstances that enabled these discourses to achieve such renown and to remain, thus far, unexposed.

But what exactly do we claim? Neither too much nor too little. We show that famous intellectuals such as Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Baudrillard and Deleuze have repeatedly abused scientific concepts and terminology: either using scientific ideas totally out of context, without giving the slightest justification — note that we are not against extrapolating concepts from one

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<sup>1</sup>Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris, October 1997.

<sup>2</sup>Henley (1997).

<sup>3</sup>Maggiori (1997).

<sup>4</sup>Sokal (1996a), reprinted here in Appendix A. The story of the hoax is described in more detail in Chapter 1 below.

field to another, but only against extrapolations made without argument — or throwing around scientific jargon in front of their non-scientist readers without any regard for its relevance or even its meaning. We make no claim that this invalidates the rest of their work, on which we suspend judgment.

We are sometimes accused of being arrogant scientists, but our view of the hard sciences' role is in fact rather modest. Wouldn't it be nice (for us mathematicians and physicists, that is) if Gödel's theorem or relativity theory *did* have immediate and deep implications for the study of society? Or if the axiom of choice could be used to study poetry? Or if topology had something to do with the human psyche? But alas, it is not the case.

A second target of our book is epistemic relativism, namely the idea — which, at least when expressed explicitly, is much more widespread in the English-speaking world than in France — that modern science is nothing more than a “myth”, a “narration” or a “social construction” among many others.<sup>5</sup> Besides some gross abuses (e.g. Irigaray), we dissect a number of confusions that are rather frequent in postmodernist and cultural-studies circles: for example, misappropriating ideas from the philosophy of science, such as the underdetermination of theory by evidence or the theory-ladenness of observation, in order to support radical relativism.

This book is therefore made up of two distinct — but related — works under one cover. First, there is the collection of extreme abuses discovered, rather haphazardly, by Sokal; this is the “fashionable nonsense” of our title. Second, there is our critique of epistemic relativism and of misconceptions about “postmodern science”; these analyses are considerably more subtle. The connection between these two critiques is primarily sociological: the French authors of the “nonsense” are fashionable in many of the same English-speaking academic circles where epistemic

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<sup>5</sup>Let us emphasize that our discussion is limited to epistemic/cognitive relativism; we do not address the more delicate issues of moral or aesthetic relativism.



relativism is the coin of the realm.<sup>6</sup> There is also a weak logical link: if one accepts epistemic relativism, there is less reason to be upset by the misrepresentation of scientific ideas, which anyway are just another “discourse”.

Obviously, we did not write this book just to point out some isolated abuses. We have larger targets in mind, but not necessarily those that are attributed to us. This book deals with mystification, deliberately obscure language, confused thinking, and the misuse of scientific concepts. The texts we quote may be the tip of an iceberg, but the iceberg should be defined as a set of intellectual practices, not a social group.

Suppose, for example, that a journalist discovers documents showing that several highly respected politicians are corrupt, and publishes them. (We emphasize that this is an analogy and that we do not consider the abuses described here to be of comparable gravity.) Some people will, no doubt, leap to the conclusion that *most* politicians are corrupt, and demagogues who stand to gain politically from this notion will encourage it.<sup>7</sup> But this extrapolation would be erroneous.

Similarly, to view this book as a generalized criticism of the humanities or the social sciences — as some French reviewers did — not only misunderstands our intentions, but is a curious assimilation, revealing a contemptuous attitude toward those fields in the minds of those reviewers.<sup>8</sup> As a matter of logic, either the humanities and social sciences are coterminous with the abuses denounced in this book, or they are not. If they are, then we

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<sup>6</sup>This overlap is, however, not perfect. The French authors analyzed in this book are most fashionable, in the English-speaking world, in departments of literature, cultural studies and women’s studies. Epistemic relativism is distributed rather more broadly, and is widespread also in domains of anthropology, education and sociology of science that exhibit little interest in Lacan or Deleuze.

<sup>7</sup>The politicians caught *in flagrante delicto* will also encourage this interpretation of the journalist’s intentions, for different (but obvious) reasons.

<sup>8</sup>Marc Richelle, in his very interesting and balanced book (1998), expresses the fear that some readers (and especially *non*-readers) of our book will jump to the conclusion that all the social sciences are nonsense. But he is careful to emphasize that this is not *our* view.

would indeed be attacking those fields *en bloc*, but it would be justified. And if not (as we believe), there is simply no reason to criticize one scholar for what another in the same field says. More generally, any construal of our book as a blanket attack on X — whether X is French thought, the American cultural left or whatever — presupposes that the whole of X is permeated by the bad intellectual habits we are denouncing, and that charge has to be established by whoever makes it.

The debates sparked by Sokal's hoax have come to encompass an ever-wider range of ever-more-tenuously related issues, concerning not only the conceptual status of scientific knowledge or the merits of French poststructuralism, but also the social role of science and technology, multiculturalism and “political correctness”, the academic left versus the academic right, and the cultural left versus the economic left. We want to emphasize that this book does *not* deal with most of these topics. In particular, the ideas analyzed here have little, if any, conceptual or logical connection with politics. Whatever one's views on Lacanian mathematics or the theory-ladenness of observation, one may hold, without fear of contradiction, any view whatsoever on military spending, national health insurance or gay marriage. There is, to be sure, a *sociological* link — though its magnitude is often exaggerated — between the “postmodernist” intellectual currents we are criticizing and some sectors of the American academic left. Were it not for this link, we would not mention politics at all. But we do not want our book to be seen as one more shot in the dreary “Culture Wars”, still less as one from the right. Critical thinking about the unfairness of our economic system and about racial and sexual oppression has grown in many academic institutions since the 1960s and has been subjected, in recent years, to much derision and unfair criticism. There is nothing in our book that can be construed, even remotely, in that genre.

Our book faces a quite different institutional context in France and in the English-speaking world. While the authors we criticize have had a profound impact on French higher education and have numerous disciples in the media, the publishing houses and the

intelligentsia — hence some of the furious reactions to our book — their Anglo-American counterparts are still an embattled minority within intellectual circles (though a well-entrenched one in some strongholds). This tends to make them look more “radical” and “subversive” than they really are, both in their own eyes and in those of their critics. But our book is not against political radicalism, it is against intellectual confusion. Our aim is not to criticize the left, but to help defend it from a trendy segment of itself. Michael Albert, writing in *Z Magazine*, summarized this well: “There is nothing truthful, wise, humane, or strategic about confusing hostility to injustice and oppression, which is leftist, with hostility to science and rationality, which is nonsense.”<sup>9</sup>

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This edition is, in most respects, a straight translation from the French original. We have omitted a chapter on the misunderstandings of relativity by Henri Bergson and his successors, which seemed to us of marginal interest for most British and American readers.<sup>10</sup> Conversely, we have expanded a few discussions concerning intellectual debates in the English-speaking world. We have also made many small changes to improve the clarity of the original text, to correct minor imprecisions, and to forestall misunderstandings. We thank the many readers of the French edition who offered us their suggestions.

While writing this book, we have benefited from innumerable discussions and debates and have received much encouragement and criticism. Although we are unable to thank individually all those who have contributed, we do want to express our gratitude to those who helped us by pointing out references or by reading and criticizing parts of the manuscript: Michael Albert, Robert Alford, Roger Balian, Louise Barre, Paul Boghossian,

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<sup>9</sup>Albert (1996, p. 69). We shall return to these political issues in the Epilogue.

<sup>10</sup>Chapter 11 of the French original.

Raymond Boudon, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Bouveresse, Georges Bricmont, James Robert Brown, Tim Budden, Noam Chomsky, Helena Cronin, Bérangère Deprez, Jean Dhombres, Cryano de Dominicis, Pascal Engel, Barbara Epstein, Roberto Fernández, Vincent Fleury, Julie Franck, Allan Franklin, Paul Gérardin, Michel Gevers, Michel Ghins, Yves Gingras, Todd Gitlin, Gerald Goldin, Sylviane Goraj, Paul Gross, Étienne Guyon, Michael Harris, Géry-Henri Hers, Gerald Holton, John Huth, Markku Javanainen, Gérard Jorland, Jean-Michel Kantor, Noretta Koertge, Hubert Krivine, Jean-Paul Krivine, Antti Kupiainen, Louis Le Borgne, Gérard Lemaine, Geert Lernout, Jerrold Levinson, Norm Levitt, Jean-Claude Limpach, Andréa Loparic, John Madore, Christian Maes, Francis Martens, Tim Maudlin, Sy Mauskopf, Jean Mawhin, Maria McGavigan, N. David Mermin, Enrique Muñoz, Meera Nanda, Michael Nauenberg, Hans-Joachim Niemann, Marina Papa, Patrick Peccatte, Jean Pestieau, Daniel Pinkas, Louis Pinto, Patricia Radelet-de Grave, Marc Richelle, Benny Rigaux-Bricmont, Ruth Rosen, David Ruelle, Patrick Sand, Mónica Santoro, Abner Shimony, Lee Smolin, Philippe Spindel, Hector Sussmann, Jukka-Pekka Takala, Serge Tisseron, Jacques Treiner, Claire Van Cutsem, Jacques Van Rillaer, Loïc Wacquant, M. Norton Wise, Nicolas Witkowski, and Daniel Zwanziger. We are also indebted to our editors Nicky White and George Witte for many valuable suggestions. We emphasize that these people are not necessarily in agreement with the contents or even the intention of this book.

Finally, we thank Marina, Claire, Thomas and Antoine for having put up with us for the past two years.

## 1. Introduction

So long as authority inspires awe, confusion and absurdity enhance conservative tendencies in society. Firstly, because clear and logical thinking leads to a cumulation of knowledge (of which the progress of the natural sciences provides the best example) and the advance of knowledge sooner or later undermines the traditional order. Confused thinking, on the other hand, leads nowhere in particular and can be indulged indefinitely without producing any impact upon the world.

— *Stanislav Andreski, Social Sciences as Sorcery*  
(1972, p. 90)

The story of this book begins with a hoax. For some years, we have been surprised and distressed by the intellectual trends in certain precincts of American academia. Vast sectors of the humanities and the social sciences seem to have adopted a philosophy that we shall call, for want of a better term, “postmodernism”: an intellectual current characterized by the more-or-less explicit rejection of the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment, by theoretical discourses disconnected from any empirical test, and by a cognitive and cultural relativism that regards science as nothing more than a “narration”, a “myth” or a social construction among many others.

To respond to this phenomenon, one of us (Sokal) decided to try an unorthodox (and admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: submit to a fashionable American cultural-studies journal, *Social Text*, a parody of the type of work that has proliferated in recent years, to see whether they would publish it. The ar-

ticle, entitled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”<sup>1</sup>, is chock-full of absurdities and blatant non-sequiturs. In addition, it asserts an extreme form of cognitive relativism: after mocking the old-fashioned “dogma” that “there exists an external world, whose properties are independent of any individual human being and indeed of humanity as a whole”, it proclaims categorically that “physical ‘reality’, no less than social ‘reality’, is at bottom a social and linguistic construct”. By a series of stunning leaps of logic, it arrives at the conclusion that “the  $\pi$  of Euclid and the  $G$  of Newton, formerly thought to be constant and universal, are now perceived in their ineluctable historicity; and the putative observer becomes fatally de-centered, disconnected from any epistemic link to a space-time point that can no longer be defined by geometry alone.” The rest is in the same vein.

And yet, the article was accepted and published. Worse, it was published in a special issue of *Social Text* devoted to rebutting the criticisms levelled against postmodernism and social constructivism by several distinguished scientists.<sup>2</sup> For the editors of *Social Text*, it was hard to imagine a more radical way of shooting themselves in the foot.

Sokal immediately revealed the hoax, provoking a firestorm of reaction in both the popular and academic press.<sup>3</sup> Many re-

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<sup>1</sup>We reprint this article in Appendix A, followed by some brief comments in Appendix B.

<sup>2</sup>Among these criticisms, see for example Holton (1993), Gross and Levitt (1994), and Gross, Levitt and Lewis (1996). The special issue of *Social Text* is introduced by Ross (1996). The parody is Sokal (1996a). The motivations for the parody are discussed in more detail in Sokal (1996c), which is reprinted here in Appendix C, and in Sokal (1997a). For earlier criticisms of postmodernism and social constructivism from a somewhat different political perspective — which are not, however, addressed in the *Social Text* issue — see e.g. Albert (1992–93), Chomsky (1992–93) and Ehrenreich (1992–93).

<sup>3</sup>The hoax was revealed in Sokal (1996b). The scandal landed (to our utter surprise) on the front page of the *New York Times* (Scott 1996), the *International Herald Tribune* (Landsberg 1996), the [London] *Observer* (Ferguson 1996), *Le Monde* (Weill 1996) and several other major newspapers. Among the reactions, see in particular the analyses by Frank (1996), Pollitt (1996),

searchers in the humanities and social sciences wrote to Sokal, sometimes very movingly, to thank him for what he had done and to express their own rejection of the postmodernist and relativist tendencies dominating large parts of their disciplines. One student felt that the money he had earned to finance his studies had been spent on the clothes of an emperor who, as in the fable, was naked. Another wrote that he and his colleagues were thrilled by the parody, but asked that his sentiments be held in confidence because, although he wanted to help change his discipline, he could do so only after securing a permanent job.

But what was all the fuss about? Media hype notwithstanding, the mere fact the parody was published proves little in itself; at most it reveals something about the intellectual standards of *one* trendy journal. More interesting conclusions can be derived, however, by examining the *content* of the parody.<sup>4</sup> On close inspection, one sees that the parody was constructed around quotations from eminent French and American intellectuals about the alleged philosophical and social implications of mathematics and the natural sciences. The passages may be absurd or meaningless, but they are nonetheless authentic. In fact, Sokal's only contribution was to provide a "glue" (the "logic" of which is admittedly whimsical) to join these quotations together and praise them. The authors in question form a veritable pantheon of contemporary "French theory": Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Félix Guattari, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, Bruno Latour, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Serres and Paul Virilio.<sup>5</sup>

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Willis (1996), Albert (1996), Weinberg (1996a, 1996b), Boghossian (1996) and Epstein (1997).

<sup>4</sup>See Sokal (1998) for a more detailed discussion.

<sup>5</sup>In this book we have added Jean Baudrillard and Julia Kristeva to the list. Five of the ten "most important" French philosophers identified by Lamont (1987, note 4) are Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard and Serres. Three of the six French philosophers chosen by Mortley (1991) are Derrida, Irigaray and Serres. Five of the eight French philosophers interviewed by Rötzer (1994) are Baudrillard, Derrida, Lyotard, Serres and Virilio. These same authors show up among the 39 Western thinkers interviewed by *Le Monde* (1984a,b), and one finds Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Irigaray, Kristeva, Lacan, Lyotard and Serres among the 50 contemporary Western

The citations also include many prominent American academics in Cultural Studies and related fields; but these authors are often, at least in part, disciples of or commentators on the French masters.

Since the quotations included in the parody were rather brief, Sokal subsequently assembled a series of longer texts to illustrate these authors' handling of the natural sciences, which he circulated among his scientific colleagues. Their reaction was a mixture of hilarity and dismay: they could hardly believe that anyone — much less renowned intellectuals — could write such nonsense. However, when non-scientists read the material, they pointed out the need to explain, in lay terms, exactly *why* the cited passages are absurd or meaningless. From that moment, the two of us worked together to produce a series of analyses and commentaries on the texts, resulting in this book.

### What we intend to show

The goal of this book is to make a limited but original contribution toward the critique of the admittedly nebulous Zeitgeist that we have called “postmodernism”. We make no claim to analyze postmodernist thought in general; rather, our aim is to draw attention to a relatively little-known aspect, namely the repeated abuse of concepts and terminology coming from mathematics and physics. We shall also analyze certain confusions of thought that are frequent in postmodernist writings and that bear on either the content or the philosophy of the natural sciences.

The word “abuse” here denotes one or more of the following characteristics:

1) Holding forth at length on scientific theories about which one has, at best, an exceedingly hazy idea. The most common tactic is to use scientific (or pseudo-scientific) terminology without bothering much about what the words actually *mean*.

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thinkers selected by Lechte (1994). Here, as in the subtitle of this book, **If there is a subtitle!!!!** the appellation “philosopher” is used in a broad sense; a more precise term would be “philosophico-literary intellectual”.



2) Importing concepts from the natural sciences into the humanities or social sciences without giving the slightest conceptual or empirical justification. If a biologist wanted to apply, in her research, elementary notions of mathematical topology, set theory or differential geometry, she would be asked to give some explanation. A vague analogy would not be taken very seriously by her colleagues. Here, by contrast, we learn from Lacan that the structure of the neurotic subject is exactly the torus (it is no less than reality itself, cf. p. 21), from Kristeva that poetic language can be theorized in terms of the cardinality of the continuum (p. 41), and from Baudrillard that modern war takes place in a non-Euclidean space (p. 149) — all without explanation.

3) Displaying a superficial erudition by shamelessly throwing around technical terms in a context where they are completely irrelevant. The goal is, no doubt, to impress and, above all, to intimidate the non-scientist reader. Even some academic and media commentators fall into the trap: Roland Barthes is impressed by the precision of Julia Kristeva's work (p. 39) and *Le Monde* admires the erudition of Paul Virilio (p. 173).

4) Manipulating phrases and sentences that are, in fact, meaningless. Some of these authors exhibit a veritable intoxication with words, combined with a superb indifference to their meaning.

These authors speak with a self-assurance that far outstrips their scientific competence: Lacan boasts of using “the most recent development in topology” (pp. 23–24) and Latour asks whether he has taught anything to Einstein (p. 131). They imagine, perhaps, that they can exploit the prestige of the natural sciences in order to give their own discourse a veneer of rigor. And they seem confident that no one will notice their misuse of scientific concepts. No one is going to cry out that the king is naked.

Our goal is precisely to say that the king is naked (and the queen too). But let us be clear. We are not attacking philosophy, the humanities or the social sciences *in general*; on the contrary, we feel that these fields are of the utmost importance and we want to warn those who work in them (especially students) against

some manifest cases of charlatanism.<sup>6</sup> In particular, we want to “deconstruct” the reputation that certain texts have of being difficult because the ideas in them are so profound. In many cases we shall demonstrate that if the texts seem incomprehensible, it is for the excellent reason that they mean precisely nothing.

There are many different degrees of abuse. At one end, one finds extrapolations of scientific concepts, beyond their domain of validity, that are erroneous but for subtle reasons. At the other end, one finds numerous texts that are full of scientific words but entirely devoid of meaning. And there is, of course, a continuum of discourses that can be situated somewhere between these two extremes. Although we shall concentrate in this book on the most manifest abuses, we shall also briefly address some less obvious confusions concerning chaos theory (Chapter 7).

Let us stress that there is nothing shameful in being ignorant of calculus or quantum mechanics. What we are criticizing is the pretension of some celebrated intellectuals to offer profound thoughts on complicated subjects that they understand, at best, at the level of popularizations.<sup>7</sup>

At this point, the reader may naturally wonder: Do these abuses arise from conscious fraud, self-deception, or perhaps a combination of the two? We are unable to offer any categorical answer to this question, due to the lack of (publicly available) evidence. But, more importantly, we must confess that we do not find this question of great interest. Our aim here is to stimulate a critical attitude, not merely towards certain individuals, but towards a part of the intelligentsia (both in the United States and in Europe) that has tolerated and even encouraged this type

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<sup>6</sup>If we refrain from giving examples of *good* work in these fields — as some readers have suggested — it is because making an exhaustive such list would go far beyond our abilities, and a partial list would immediately bog us down in irrelevancies (why do you mention X and not Y?).

<sup>7</sup>Several commentators (Droit 1997, Stengers 1997, *Economist* 1997) have compared us to schoolteachers giving poor grades in mathematics and physics to Lacan, Kristeva *et al.* But the analogy is faulty: in school one is obliged to study certain subjects, but no one forced these authors to invoke technical mathematical concepts in their writings.

of discourse.

### Yes, but . . .

Before proceeding any further, let us answer some of the objections that will no doubt occur to the reader:

1. *The quotations' marginality.* It could be argued that we are splitting hairs, criticizing authors who admittedly have no scientific training and who have perhaps made a mistake in venturing onto unfamiliar terrain, but whose contribution to philosophy and/or the social sciences is nevertheless important and is in no way invalidated by the “small errors” we have uncovered. We would respond, first of all, that these texts contain much more than mere “errors”: they display a profound indifference, if not a disdain, for facts and logic. Our goal is not, therefore, to poke fun at literary critics who make mistakes when citing relativity or Gödel's theorem, but to defend the canons of rationality and intellectual honesty that are (or should be) common to all scholarly disciplines.

It goes without saying that we are not competent to judge the non-scientific aspects of these authors' work. We understand perfectly well that their “interventions” in the natural sciences do not constitute the central themes of their *œuvre*. But when intellectual dishonesty (or gross incompetence) is discovered in one part — even a marginal part — of someone's writings, it is natural to want to examine more critically the rest of his or her work. We do not want to prejudge the results of such an analysis, but simply to remove the aura of profundity that has sometimes intimidated students (and professors) from undertaking it.

When ideas are accepted on the basis of fashion or dogma, they are especially sensitive to the exposure even of marginal aspects. For example, geological discoveries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries showed that the earth is vastly older than the 5000-or-so years recounted in the Bible; and although these findings directly contradicted only a small part of the Bible, they had the indirect effect of undermining its overall credibility as a factual account of history, so that nowadays few people (ex-

cept in the United States) believe in the Bible in the *literal* way that most Europeans did only a few centuries ago. Consider, by contrast, Isaac Newton's work: it is estimated that 90% of his writings deal with alchemy or mysticism. But, so what? The rest survives because it is based on solid empirical and rational arguments. Similarly, most of Descartes' physics is false, but some of the philosophical questions he raised are still pertinent today. If the same can be said for the work of our authors, then our findings have only marginal relevance. But if these writers have become international stars primarily for sociological rather than intellectual reasons, and in part because they are masters of language and can impress their audience with a clever abuse of sophisticated terminology — non-scientific as well as scientific — then the revelations contained in this essay may indeed have significant repercussions.

Let us emphasize that these authors differ enormously in their attitude toward science and the importance they give it. They should not be lumped together in a single category, and we want to warn the reader against the temptation to do so. For example, although the quotation from Derrida contained in Sokal's parody is rather amusing<sup>8</sup>, it is a one-shot abuse; since there is no systematic misuse of (or indeed attention to) science in Derrida's work, there is no chapter on Derrida in this book. By contrast, the work of Serres is replete with more-or-less poetic allusions to science and its history; but his assertions, though extremely vague, are in general neither completely meaningless nor completely false, and so we have not discussed them here in detail.<sup>9</sup> Kristeva's early writings relied strongly (and abusively) on mathematics, but she abandoned this approach more than twenty years ago; we criticize them here because we consider them symptomatic of a certain intellectual style. The other authors, by contrast, have all invoked science extensively in their work. Latour's writings provide considerable grist for the mill of

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<sup>8</sup>The complete quote can be found in Derrida (1970, pp. 265–268).

<sup>9</sup>See, nevertheless, Chapter 11 and pp. 229, 274 for some examples of more manifest abuses in Serres' work.

contemporary relativism and are based on an allegedly rigorous analysis of scientific practice. The works of Baudrillard, Deleuze, Guattari and Virilio are filled with seemingly erudite references to relativity, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, etc. So we are by no means splitting hairs in establishing that their scientific erudition is exceedingly superficial. Moreover, for several authors, we shall supply references to additional texts where the reader can find numerous further abuses.

2. *You don't understand the context.* Defenders of Lacan, Deleuze *et al.* might argue that their invocations of scientific concepts are valid and even profound, and that our criticisms miss the point because we fail to understand the context. After all, we readily admit that we do not always understand the rest of these authors' work. Mightn't we be arrogant and narrow-minded scientists, missing something subtle and deep?

We would respond, first of all, that when concepts from mathematics or physics are invoked in another domain of study, some argument ought to be given to justify their relevance. In all the cases cited here, we have checked that no such argument is provided, whether next to the excerpt we quote or elsewhere in the article or book.

Moreover, there are some "rules of thumb" that can be used to decide whether mathematics are being introduced with some real intellectual goal in mind, or merely to impress the reader. First of all, in cases of legitimate use, the author needs to have a good understanding of the mathematics he/she is purporting to apply — in particular, there should be no gross mistakes — and he/she should explain the requisite technical notions, as clearly as possible, in terms that will be understandable to the intended reader (who is presumably a non-scientist). Secondly, because mathematical concepts have precise meanings, mathematics is useful primarily when applied to fields in which the concepts likewise have more-or-less precise meanings. It is difficult to see how the mathematical notion of compact space can be applied fruitfully to something as ill-defined as the "space of *jouissance*" in psychoanalysis. Thirdly, one should be particularly suspicious when abstruse mathematical concepts (like the axiom of choice

in set theory) that are used rarely, if at all, in physics — and certainly never in chemistry or biology — miraculously become relevant in the humanities or the social sciences.

3. *Poetic licence.* If a poet uses words like “black hole” or “degree of freedom” out of context and without really understanding their scientific meaning, it doesn’t bother us. Likewise, if a science-fiction writer uses secret passageways in space-time in order to send her characters back to the era of the Crusades, it is purely a question of taste whether one likes or dislikes the technique.

By contrast, we insist that the examples cited in this book have nothing to do with poetic licence. These authors are holding forth, in utter seriousness, on philosophy, psychoanalysis, semiotics or sociology. Their works are the subject of innumerable analyses, exegeses, seminars and doctoral theses.<sup>10</sup> Their intention is clearly to produce theory, and it is on this ground that we criticize them. Moreover, their style is usually heavy and pompous, so it is highly unlikely that their goal is principally literary or poetic.

4. *The role of metaphors.* Some people will no doubt think that we are interpreting these authors too literally and that the passages we quote should be read as metaphors rather than as precise logical arguments. Indeed, in certain cases the “science” *is* undoubtedly intended metaphorically; but what is the purpose of these metaphors? After all, a metaphor is usually employed to clarify an unfamiliar concept by relating it to a more familiar one, not the reverse. Suppose, for example, that in a theoretical physics seminar we were to explain a very technical concept in quantum field theory by comparing it to the concept of aporia in Derridean literary theory. Our audience of physicists would wonder, quite reasonably, what is the goal of such a metaphor — whether or not it is apposite — apart from displaying our

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<sup>10</sup>To illustrate more clearly that their claims are taken seriously in at least some parts of the English-speaking academy, we shall cite secondary works that analyze and elaborate, for example, Lacan’s topology and mathematical logic, Irigaray’s fluid mechanics, and Deleuze and Guattari’s pseudo-scientific inventions.

own erudition. In the same way, we fail to see the advantage of invoking, even metaphorically, scientific concepts that one oneself understands only shakily when addressing a readership composed almost entirely of non-scientists. Might the goal be to pass off as profound a rather banal philosophical or sociological observation, by dressing it up in fancy scientific jargon?

5. *The role of analogies.* Many authors, including some of those discussed here, try to argue by analogy. We are by no means opposed to the effort to establish analogies between diverse domains of human thought; indeed, the observation of a valid analogy between two existing theories can often be very useful for the subsequent development of both. Here, however, we think that the analogies are between well-established theories (in the natural sciences) and theories too vague to be tested empirically (for example, Lacanian psychoanalysis). One cannot help but suspect that the function of these analogies is to hide the weaknesses of the vaguer theory.

Let us emphasize that a half-formulated theory — be it in physics, biology or the social sciences — cannot be redeemed simply by wrapping it in symbols or formulae. The sociologist Stanislav Andreski has expressed this idea with his habitual irony:

The recipe for authorship in this line of business is as simple as it is rewarding: just get hold of a textbook of mathematics, copy the less complicated parts, put in some references to the literature in one or two branches of the social studies without worrying unduly about whether the formulae which you wrote down have any bearing on the real human actions, and give your product a good-sounding title, which suggests that you have found a key to an exact science of collective behaviour. (Andreski 1972, pp. 129–130)

Andreski's critique was originally aimed at American quantitative sociology, but it is equally applicable to some of the texts cited here, notably those of Lacan and Kristeva.

6. *Who is competent?* We have frequently been asked the following question: You want to prevent philosophers from speaking

about science because they don't have the requisite formal training; but what qualifications do you have to speak of philosophy? This question betrays a number of misunderstandings. First of all, we have no desire to prevent anyone from speaking about anything. Secondly, the intellectual value of an intervention is determined by its content, not by the identity of the speaker, much less by his or her diplomas.<sup>11</sup> Thirdly, there is an asymmetry: we

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<sup>11</sup>The linguist Noam Chomsky illustrates this very well:

In my own professional work I have touched on a variety of different fields. I've done work in mathematical linguistics, for example, without any professional credentials in mathematics; in this subject I am completely self-taught, and not very well taught. But I've often been invited by universities to speak on mathematical linguistics at mathematics seminars and colloquia. No one has ever asked me whether I have the appropriate credentials to speak on these subjects; the mathematicians couldn't care less. What they want to know is what I have to say. No one has ever objected to my right to speak, asking whether I have a doctor's degree in mathematics, or whether I have taken advanced courses in this subject. That would never have entered their minds. They want to know whether I am right or wrong, whether the subject is interesting or not, whether better approaches are possible — the discussion dealt with the subject, not with my right to discuss it.

But on the other hand, in discussion or debate concerning social issues or American foreign policy, Vietnam or the Middle East, for example, the issue is constantly raised, often with considerable venom. I've repeatedly been challenged on grounds of credentials, or asked, what special training do you have that entitles you to speak of these matters. The assumption is that people like me, who are outsiders from a professional viewpoint, are not entitled to speak on such things.

Compare mathematics and the political sciences — it's quite striking. In mathematics, in physics, people are concerned with what you say, not with your certification. But in order to speak about social reality, you must have the proper credentials, particularly if you depart from the accepted framework of thinking. Generally speaking, it seems fair to say that the richer the intellectual substance of a field, the less there is a concern for credentials, and the greater is the concern for content. (Chomsky 1979, pp. 6–7)



do not purport to judge Lacan's psychoanalysis, Deleuze's philosophy or Latour's concrete work in sociology. We limit ourselves to their statements about the mathematical and physical sciences or about elementary problems in the philosophy of science.

7. *Don't you too rely on argument from authority?* For if we assert that Lacan's mathematics are nonsense, how is the non-scientist reader to judge? Mustn't he or she take our word for it?

Not entirely. First of all, we have tried hard to provide detailed explanations of the scientific background, so that the non-specialist reader can appreciate *why* a particular assertion is erroneous or meaningless. We may not have succeeded in all cases: space is limited, and scientific pedagogy is difficult. The reader is perfectly entitled to reserve judgment in those cases where our explanation is inadequate. But, most importantly, it should be remembered that our criticism does *not* deal primarily with errors, but with the manifest *irrelevance* of the scientific terminology to the subject supposedly under investigation. In all the reviews, debates and private correspondence that have followed the publication of our book in France, no one has given even the slightest argument explaining how that relevance could be established.

8. *But these authors are not "postmodernist"*. It is true that the French authors discussed in this book do not all regard themselves as "postmodernist" or "poststructuralist". Some of these texts were published prior to the emergence of these intellectual currents, and some of these authors reject any link with these currents. Moreover, the intellectual abuses criticized in this book are not homogeneous; they can be classified, very roughly, into two distinct categories, corresponding roughly to two distinct phases in French intellectual life. The first phase is that of extreme structuralism, extending through the early 1970s: the authors try desperately to give vague discourses in the human sciences a veneer of "scientificity" by invoking the trappings of mathematics. Lacan's work and the early writings of Kristeva fall into this category. The second phase is that of poststructuralism, beginning in the mid-1970s: here any pretense at "scientificity" is

abandoned, and the underlying philosophy (to the extent one can be discerned) tends toward irrationalism or nihilism. The texts of Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari exemplify this attitude.

Furthermore, the very idea that there exists a distinctive category of thought called “postmodernist” is much less widespread in France than in the English-speaking world. If we nevertheless employ this term for convenience, it is because all the authors analyzed here are utilized as fundamental points of reference in English-language postmodernist discourse, and because some aspects of their writings (obscure jargon, implicit rejection of rational thought, abuse of science as metaphor) are common traits of Anglo-American postmodernism. In any case, the validity of our critiques can in no way depend on the use of a word; our arguments must be judged, for each author, independently of his or her link — be it conceptually justified or merely sociological — with the broader “postmodernist” current.

9. *Why do you criticize these authors and not others?* A long list of “others” has been suggested, both in print and in private correspondence: these include virtually all applications of mathematics to the social sciences (e.g. economics), physicists’ speculations in popular books (e.g. Hawking, Penrose), sociobiology, cognitive science, information theory, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the use of scientific concepts and formulas by Hume, La Mettrie, D’Holbach, Helvetius, Condillac, Comte, Durkheim, Pareto, Engels and sundry others.<sup>12</sup>

Let us begin by observing that this question is irrelevant to the validity or invalidity of our arguments; at best it can be used to cast aspersions on our intentions. Suppose there are other abuses as bad as those of Lacan or Deleuze; how would that justify the latter?

However, since the question of the grounds for our “selection” is so often asked, let us try to answer it briefly. First of all, we have no desire to write a ten-volume encyclopedia on “nonsense since Plato”, nor do we have the competence to do so. Our scope

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<sup>12</sup>See, for example, Lévy-Leblond (1997) and Fuller (1998).

is limited, firstly, to abuses in those scientific fields in which we can claim some expertise, namely mathematics and physics<sup>13</sup>; secondly, to abuses that are currently fashionable in influential intellectual circles; and thirdly, to abuses that have not previously been analyzed in detail. However, even within these constraints, we do not claim that our set of targets is exhaustive or that they constitute a “natural kind”. Quite simply, Sokal stumbled on most of these texts in the course of writing his parody, and we decided, after reflection, that it was worth making them public.

Furthermore, we contend that there is a profound difference between the texts analyzed here and most of the other examples that have been suggested to us. The authors quoted in this book clearly do not have more than the vaguest understanding of the scientific concepts they invoke and, most importantly, they fail to give any argument justifying the relevance of these scientific concepts to the subjects allegedly under study. They are engaged in name-dropping, not just faulty reasoning. Thus, while it is very important to evaluate critically the uses of mathematics in the social sciences and the philosophical or speculative assertions made by natural scientists, these projects are different from — and considerably more subtle than — our own.<sup>14</sup>

A related question is:

10. *Why do you write a book on this and not on more serious issues? Is postmodernism such a great danger to civilization?* First of all, this is an odd question. Suppose someone discovers documents relevant to the history of Napoleon and writes a book about it. Would anyone ask him whether he thinks this is a

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<sup>13</sup>It would be interesting to attempt a similar project on the abuse of biology, computer science or linguistics, but we leave that task to people more qualified than ourselves.

<sup>14</sup>Let us mention in passing two examples of the latter type of critique, authored by one of us: a detailed analysis of the popular books of Prigogine and Stengers dealing with chaos, irreversibility and the arrow of time (Bricmont 1995a), and a criticism of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bricmont 1995b). In our opinion Prigogine and Stengers give the educated public a distorted view of the topics they treat, but their abuses do not even come close to those analyzed in this book. And the deficiencies of the Copenhagen interpretation are vastly subtler.

more important topic than World War II? His answer, and ours, would be that an author writes on a subject under two conditions: that he is competent and that he is able to contribute something original. His subject will not, unless he is particularly lucky, coincide with the most important problem in the world.

Of course we do not think that postmodernism is a great danger to civilization. Viewed on a global scale, it is a rather marginal phenomenon, and there are far more dangerous forms of irrationalism — religious fundamentalism, for instance. But we do think that the critique of postmodernism is worthwhile for intellectual, pedagogical, cultural and political reasons; we shall return to these themes in the Epilogue.

Finally, to avoid useless polemics and facile “refutations”, let us emphasize that this book is not a right-wing pamphlet against left-wing intellectuals, or an American imperialist attack against the Parisian intelligentsia, or a simple know-nothing appeal to “common sense”. In fact, the scientific rigor we are advocating often leads to results at odds with “common sense”; obscurantism, confused thinking, anti-scientific attitudes and the quasi-religious veneration of “great intellectuals” are in no way left-wing; and the attachment of part of the American intelligentsia to postmodernism demonstrates that the phenomenon is international. In particular, our critique is in no way motivated by the “theoretical nationalism and protectionism” that French writer Didier Eribon claims to detect in the work of some American critics.<sup>15</sup> Our aim is, quite simply, to denounce intellectual posturing and dishonesty, from wherever they come. If a significant part of the postmodernist “discourse” in contemporary American and British academia is of French origin, it is equally true that English-language intellectuals have long since given it an authentic home-grown flavor.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Eribon (1994, p. 70).

<sup>16</sup>We shall return to these cultural and political themes in the Epilogue.

**Plan of this book**

The bulk of this book consists of an analysis of texts, author by author. For the convenience of non-specialist readers, we have provided, in footnotes, brief explanations of the relevant scientific concepts as well as references to good popular and semi-popular explanatory texts.

Some readers will no doubt think that we are taking these texts too seriously. That is true, in some sense. But since these texts *are* taken seriously by many people, we think that they deserve to be analyzed with the greatest rigor. In some cases we have quoted rather long passages, at the risk of boring the reader, in order to show that we have not misrepresented the meaning of the text by pulling sentences out of context.

In addition to abuses in the strict sense, we have also analyzed certain scientific and philosophical confusions that underlie much postmodernist thinking. First, we shall consider the problem of cognitive relativism, and show that a series of ideas coming from the history and philosophy of science do not have the radical implications that are often attributed to them (Chapter 4). Next we shall address several misunderstandings concerning chaos theory and so-called “postmodern science” (Chapter 7). Finally, in the Epilogue, we shall situate our critique in a wider cultural context.

Many of the texts quoted in this book originally appeared in French. Where a published English translation exists, we have most often used it (sometimes noting our corrections); it is cited in the bibliography, along with the original French source in brackets. In other cases, the translation is ours. We have endeavored to remain as faithful as possible to the original French, and in case of doubt we have reproduced the latter in brackets or even *in toto*. We assure the reader that if the passage seems incomprehensible in English, it is because the original French is likewise.